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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the 1980s, many defense advocates and pro-business or-
ganizations began to push for a comprehensive reform of the American tort sys-
tem, which they viewed as being unfair to defendants, especially those who are
perceived to have "deep pockets" from which to pay substantial damage
awards.' The efforts of these organizations did not go unrewarded as thirty-five
states enacted tort reform legislation during a twenty month period in the mid
1980s.2 One of the principal targets of this tort reform movement, which is still
ongoing today, has been the rule of joint and several liability. 3 The rule of joint
and several liability, in its pure form, allows a plaintiff to sue multiple tortfea-
sors in the same action and enforce the judgment against any one of the tortfea-
sors who are found to be a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.4 Thus,
where a plaintiffs injuries have been caused by the tortious actions of multiple
tortfeasors, any single defendant may be forced to pay the entire judgment re-
gardless of the amount of fault the jury has attributed to his actions.5 Some de-
fense and business advocates believe that this leads to unfair results for defen-
dants, especially those with "deep pockets," because a defendant who is deter-
mined by a jury to be minimally at fault may end up paying the entire judgment
when one or more of his co-defendants are insolvent, immune or otherwise un-
I See DAN. B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1085 (West Group 2000); Mike Steenson, Recent
Legislative Responses to the Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 23 TORT & INS. L. J. 482 (1988);
Aaron D. Twerski, Colloquy: The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response to the
Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1125 (1989).
2 See Twerski, supra note 1, at 1125 n.1.
3 See Steenson, supra note 1; Twerski, supra note 1, at 1126-1127; Richard W. Wright, Allo-
cating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several
Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1147-1148 (1988)
[hereinafter Wright, Allocating Liability]. See also U.S. ATr'Y GEN. TORT POuCY WORKING
GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 33-34
(U.S. G.P.O. 1986) [hereinafter ATr'Y GEN. REPORT]; U.S. ATr'Y GEN. TORT POLICY WORKING
GROUP, AN UPDATE ON THE LIABILITY CRISIS 76-77 (U.S. G.P.O. 1987) [hereinafter ATT'Y GEN.
REPORT UPDATE]; AMERCAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY RULE
REFORM (2001), http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7345 [hereinafter ATRA, JOINT AND
SEVERAL LIABILITY].
4 See Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 679, 684 (W. Va. 1982); DOBBS, supra
note 1, at 413; Steenson, supra note 1, at 482.
5 "A plaintiff may elect to sue any or all of those responsible for his injuries and collect his
damages from whomever is able to pay, irrespective of their percentage of fault." Sitzes ,289
S.E.2d at 684. See also DOBBS, supra note 1, at 413; Steenson, supra note 1, at 482; James J.
Scheske, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Theory: A Survey of State Approaches, 54 J.
AIR L. & COM. 627, 635 (1988); ATr'Y GEN. REPORT, supra note 3; ATT'Y GEN. REPORT UPDATE,
supra note 3; ATRA, JoINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, supra note 3.
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available.6 Accordingly, many organizations have pushed for the abolition or
modification of joint and several liability.7 The result of their efforts has been
that approximately forty-three states have adopted some sort of joint and several
liability reform.8
Like many other states, West Virginia has not been able to escape criti-
cism of its civil justice system.9 One factor that had spawned much of this criti-
cism had been the State's longtime devotion to the doctrine of joint and several
liability.' ° In fact, as of the year 2000, when the Restatement (Third) of Torts
was published, it listed West Virginia as one of only nine comparative negli-
6 See, e.g., ATRA, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, supra note 3; ATr'Y GEN. REPORT, supra
note 3; ATr'Y GEN. REPORT UPDATE, supra note 3.
7 See id; Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note 3, at 1142; Twerski, supra note 1, at 1127.
8 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (1989); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (1988); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-55-201 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5
(West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 2006); GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-12-31 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 633-10.9 (1986); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-
803 (1987); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-117 (1986); IND. CODE § 34-51-2-8 (1998); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 668.4 (West 1997); Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978) (holding that the adop-
tion of comparative negligence by the Kansas Legislature barred the application of joint and sev-
eral liability); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (West 1996); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (1996);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 87A 34 (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6304 (1995); MINN.
STAT. § 604.02 (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (2004); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.067 (2005);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-705 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT § 25-21,185.10 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §
41.141 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-e (1990); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.3 (West
1995); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (1987); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.22 (West 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 15 (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.610
(1995); PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15 (2005); S.D. CODIRED LAWS
§ 15-8-15.1 (1987); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the
adoption of comparative negligence renders joint and several liability obsolete); TEX CONST. art.
3, § 66 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1985); WASH
REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1986); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-24 (2005); WIS. STAT. § 895.045 (1995);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1986); see also ATRA, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, supra note 3.
9 In fact, the American Tort Reform Association named West Virginia one of its top judicial
"hellholes" for the years 2002 to 2005. See AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, BRINGING
JUSTICE To JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2002 19-20 (2002),
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2002/hellholes-report-2002.pdf; AMERICAN TORT REFORM
ASSOCIATION, BRINGING JUSTICE To JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2003 11 (2003),
http://www.atra.org/reportslhellholes/2003/report.pdf; AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION,
JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004 9 (2004) http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004/hellholes2004.pdf;
AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2005 18 (2005),
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2005/hellholes2005.pdf [hereinafter ATRA, JUDICIAL
HELLHOLES 2005] (copy on file with Author). Moreover, in 2002, State Farm Insurance, West
Virginia's largest insurer, ceased writing new homeowner's insurance and business policies in the
state of West Virginia as a result of its disgust with the state's liberal tort policies. See Editorial,
Our Views Insurance When Lawmakers Listen, Business Can Happen in W Va., CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, April 30, 2005 at A5.
10 For example, the West Virginia Chamber of Commerce ranked civil justice reform as the
top "key issue" for West Virginia businesses in 2005. The Chamber listed joint and several liabil-
ity reform as a key component to civil justice reform in West Virginia. See generally ATRA,
JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2005, supra note 9.
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gence jurisdictions to employ a pure joint and several liability regime.11 But on
April 9, 2005, the West Virginia legislature passed West Virginia Code section
55-7-24, which modifies the doctrine of joint and several liability as to any ac-
tion filed after July 1, 2005.12 Although it does not completely abolish the doc-
trine of joint and several liability in West Virginia, the statute does substantially
modify it by adopting a hybrid scheme of apportioning damages modeled after
several provisions espoused by the American Law Institute's Restatement
(Third) of Torts. 13 This Note will argue that West Virginia Code section 55-7-
24 is step in the right direction towards eliminating the problems attendant to
joint and several liability. But the Note will also argue that the statute did not
go far enough in mitigating joint and several liability's adverse consequences.
Part II of this Note will provide a background of joint and several liabil-
ity both generally and in the State of West Virginia particularly. Part 1II of this
Note will argue that the doctrine of joint and several liability leads to injustice
and unfairness for defendants in a variety of ways. It will also be argued in Part
III that pure joint and several liability is wholly inconsistent with the principles
of comparative negligence. Part IV of this Note will discuss the various provi-
sions of West Virginia Code section 55-7-24. Part V of this note will provide an
analysis and argue that this statute is a step in the right direction which will
mitigate some of the injustice and inconsistencies attendant to joint and several
liability. However, it will also be argued in Part V that the West Virginia Legis-
lature did not go far enough in mitigating the adverse consequences of the doc-
trine. Finally, Part VI of this Note will provide a proposed model statute which
this author thinks the Legislature should consider the next time it takes up this
issue.
1I. BACKGROUND
A. General History of Joint and Several Liability
Courts began to apply the concept of joint and several liability well be-
fore the twentieth century. 14 In fact, joint and several liability was applied as
early as 1771 in the English case of Hill v. Goodchild15 In that case, Lord
Mansfield held that the jury could not assess several damages against two de-
fendants where they had been found guilty of a joint trespass. 16 This method of
11 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17 reporters' note cmt. a
(2000).
12 See W. VA. CODE § 55-7-24 (2005).
13 See id.; RESTATEMENT §§ 17-E21.
14 See Hill v. Goodchild, (1771) 98 Eng. Rep. 465 (H.L.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §
A18 reporters' note cmt. a (2004).
15 Hill, 98 Eng. Rep. at 465.
16 Id. at 466. The general idea behind the joint and several liability doctrine is that damages
are incapable of being apportioned among the parties. This is the same idea that is behind the
[Vol. 109
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assessing damages was generally limited, in the early cases, to instances where
the defendants had acted in concert to bring about harm to the plaintiff. 7 How-
ever, the common law soon developed another concept which held that a defen-
dant, in the absence of a concert of action, could still be liable for the entire loss
of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that he was only a partial cause of it.'
8
This is the rule that we know today as joint and several liability.
Like their English counterparts, American courts began to frequently
apply the rule of joint and several liability to multiple tortfeasors who, acting
independently of each other, combined to bring about an indivisible harm to the
plaintiff. 19 Although some early American Courts resisted the application of
joint and several liability in the absence of concerted action 20 , the doctrine none-
theless became the favored rule in many American jurisdictions. 21 Most com-
mentators of this time lent their support to the doctrine of joint and several li-
ability as well.22
The 1980s represented a change in attitude toward the doctrine of joint
and several liability. It was during this time that many organizations began to
call for tort reform in America. 23 Among the reforms pushed by these organiza-
tions was a call to either abolish or substantially modify the doctrine of joint and
several liability. 24 This effort has been very successful. 25 Most states have re-
formed the doctrine of joint and several liability since the 1980s by either modi-
common law doctrine of contributory negligence. See Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative
Negligence In An Era of Tort Reform: Decisions For Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REV. 199, 204
(1990).
17 See William Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 418 (1937).
"The rule grew out of the common law concept of the unity of the cause of action; the jury could
not be permitted to apportion the damages, since there was but one wrong." Id.
18 Id.
19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § A18 reporters' note cmt. a
(2000).
20 See Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux, 23 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. Comm'n. App. 1930), overruled
by Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1952); RESTATEMENT §
A18 reporters' note cmt. a.
21 RESTATEMENT § A18 reporters' note cmt. a.
22 See, e.g., Roy D. Jackson, Jr., Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. REV. 399, 403
(1939); Diversities De La Ley, Joint Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages; Making the Innocent
Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REv. 458, 459 (1923); RESTATEMENT § A18 reporters'
note cmt. a.
23 See Scheske, supra note 5, at 627; Steenson, supra note 1, at 482; ATr'Y GEN. REPORT,
supra note 3; ATT'y GEN. REPORT UPDATE, supra note 3; Frank J. Macchiarola, Preface to THE
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW, at vii (Walter Olson ed.,
Capital City Press 1988).
2 See Steenson, supra note 1; Twerski, supra note 1, at 1126-1127; Wright, Allocating Liabil-
ity, supra note 3, at 1147-1148; ATRA, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, supra note 3; Arr'Y GEN.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 33-34; U.S. ATr'Y GEN. REPORT UPDATE, supra note 3, at 76-77.
25 In 1986 and 1987 alone, at least half of the states enacted legislation that either modified or
abolished joint and several liability. See Steenson, supra note 1, at 482.
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fying the doctrine or eliminating it all together.26 These reforms have taken
different forms in different jurisdictions.27 But these different approaches to
joint and several liability reform can be grouped into four general categories: (1)
states that have abolished joint and several liability with limited exceptions; (2)
states that have abolished joint and several liability but allow for a reallocation
amongst the parties of uncollectible damages; (3) states that have abolished joint
and several liability for Defendants whose fault is determined to be below a
designated threshold; and (4) states that have eliminated joint and several liabil-
ity for certain types of damages.28
B. History of Joint and Several Liability in West Virginia
As early as 1906, the West Virginia Supreme Court began to apply joint
and several liability in cases where multiple defendants acted independently to
bring about a single indivisible injury to the plaintiff.29 In at least one subse-
quent case, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court briefly retreated from
the application of joint and several liability where the defendants had acted
independently to cause the plaintiffs injury.30 In that case, the Court held that
there could be neither joint liability nor liability for the entirety of the plaintiff's
damages where the defendants had acted "without concert, collusion, or com-
mon design, and [where] the injury to the plaintiff [was] consequential only...
as [opposed to] direct and immediate.,,31 But this retreat from the doctrine of
joint and several liability was short lived and, by 1956, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court had clearly recognized that pure joint and several liability was the
applicable rule in all cases where multiple tortfeasors combined to cause a sin-
gle injury to the plaintiff.
32
26 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1087; RESTATEMENT § 17 reporters' note cmt. a; Richard W.
Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 45 (1993)
[hereinafter Wright, Logic and Fairness]; Richard W. Wright, Throwing Out the Baby with the
Bathwater: A Reply to Professor Twerski, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1147 (1989) [hereinafter Wright,
Throwing Out the Baby].
27 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1087; Steenson, supra note 1, at 485; Scheske, supra note 5, at
642-650.
28 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1087; RESTATEMENT § 17; Steenson, supra note 1, at 485.
29 See Day v. Louisville Coal & Coke Co., 53 S.E. 776, 778 (W. Va. 1906).
30 See Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 102 S.E. 265, 266-268 (W. Va. 1920).
31 Id. at 267.
32 See Muldoon v. Kepner, 91 S.E.2d 727, 731 (W. Va. 1956). Muldoon involved a plaintiff
who was injured as a result of the negligence of an ambulance driver, with whom she was riding
as a guest passenger, and the negligence of the operator of an oncoming vehicle, which collided
into the ambulance. Id. at 728. Although the ambulance driver and the driver of the oncoming
vehicle had obviously not acted in concert, the West Virginia Supreme Court nevertheless applied
the rule of joint and several liability, making it clear that "[in [West Virginia,] the liability of
tortfeasors is both joint and several." Id. at 731 (citing Day, 53 S.E. 776). The Court further so-
lidified the concept of joint and several liability in West Virginia by proclaiming that "where a
person is injured as the result of the concurrent wrongdoing of several joint tortfeasors, the injured
[Vol. 109
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In 1979, the West Virginia Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of
contributory negligence and adopted a modified regime of comparative negli-
gence.33 This could have put the doctrine of joint and several liability on shaky
footing in West Virginia as a few its sister jurisdictions had abolished or modi-
fied the doctrine of joint and several liability upon their adoption of comparative
negligence. 34 But in spite of its adoption of comparative negligence, the West
Virginia Supreme Court solidified its devotion to the doctrine of joint and sev-
eral liability in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., holding that the doctrine of
comparative negligence had no effect on joint and several liability in West Vir-
ginia.35 West Virginia would continue to be committed to the doctrine of joint
and several liability into the twenty-first century. 36 But in 2005, the West Vir-
ginia Legislature passed West Virginia Code section 55-7-2437 which limits the
role of joint and several liability in the State of West Virginia.
III. PURE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
Joint and several liability has two important principles. First, a plaintiff
may collect all of his damages from any one of several tortfeasors who are
38found to be a proximate cause of his injuries. 38 Second, the risk that one or
more co-defendants will be insolvent, immune or otherwise unavailable falls
completely on solvent defendants. 39 These principles lead to undesirable results
in two ways. First, they result in unfairness to defendants, particularly those who
person may proceed against any or all of the joint tort feasors in an action at law to recover dam-
ages for his alleged injuries." Id. (citing Massey v. Payne, 155 S.E. 658, 659 (W. Va. 1930)).
33 See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 1979).
34 See, e.g., Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978) (holding that the adoption of com-
parative negligence by the Kansas Legislature barred the application of joint and several liabil-
ity.); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the adoption of com-
parative negligence renders joint and several liability obsolete.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109
(1986); see also 65 C.J.S. Negligence. § 155 (2005); Wright, Logic and Fairness, supra note 26,
at 46.
35 256 S.E.2d at 886.
36 "[T]his jurisdiction is committed to the concept of joint and several liability among joint
tortfeasors. A plaintiff may elect to sue any or all of those responsible for his injuries and collect
his damages from who[m] ever is able to pay, irrespective of their percentage of fault." Strahin v.
Cleavenger, 603 S.E.2d 197, 211 (W. Va. 2004) (citing Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 289
S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1982)).
37 See S.B. 421, 2005 Regular Session (W. Va. 2005); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-24.
38 "A plaintiff may elect to sue any or all of those responsible for his injuries and collect his
damages from whomever is able to pay, irrespective of their percentage of fault." Sitzes v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 679, 684 (W. Va. 1982). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § A18 cmt. a (2000); DOBBS, supra note 1, at 413; Steenson,
supra note 1, at 482; James J. Scheske, supra note 5, at 635 (1988); ATr'v GEN. REPORT, supra
note 3; ATr'Y GEN. REPORT UPDATE, supra note 3; ATRA, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, supra
note 3.
39 See RESTATEMENT § A18 cmt. a.
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are thought of as "deep pocket" defendants.4° Second, the principles of joint
and several liability do not fall in line with the equitable principles of compara-
tive negligence.4'
A. Pure Joint and Several Liability is Unfair to Solvent Defendants Where
One or More Co-Defendants Are Insolvent, Immune or Otherwise Un-
available
In cases where all parties who are responsible for the plaintiffs injuries
are solvent, available, and amenable to suit, the consequences of joint and sev-
eral liability are of no importance. 42 In this variety of cases the rules of contri-
bution4 3, one recovery", and liberal joinder45 typically combine to ensure that
defendants pay no more than their fair share of damages. 46 However, if one or
more co-defendants are insolvent, immune, or otherwise unavailable, the doc-
trine of joint and several liability exposes the remaining solvent defendants to a
variety of injustices, including requiring minimally responsible defendants to
pay more than their fair share of the plaintiffs damages, violating the principle
of corrective justice when it requires "deep pocket" defendants to stand in as
social insurers against the plaintiff's losses, exposing "deep pocket" defendants
to abusive litigation practices such as "shotgun pleading", and requiring defen-
dants to bear the entire costs of risk creating activities that society has chosen to
immunize.
40 See A"'Y GEN. REPORT, supra note 3, at 64; AT'rY GEN. REPORT UPDATE, supra note 3, at
76; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1085; Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic
Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 628, 635-636 (1988). "Deep pocket" defendants are generally identified as those with
enough wealth or liability insurance with which to pay large damage awards. General examples
of "deep pocket" defendants include municipalities, corporations, and professionals. See Twerski,
supra note 1, at 1139.
41 See sources cited supra note 40.
42 See Manzer, supra note 40, at 635.
43 Early common law rules prevented defendants, against whom a joint and several liability
judgment was enforced, from seeking contribution from other responsible parties. See W.E. Ship-
ley, Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, 34 A.L.R. 2d 1107, § 1 (1954); DOBBS,
supra note 1, at 1078; Manzer, supra note 40, at 635 n.44. However, most jurisdictions now
allow a defendant against whom a joint and several liability judgment has been enforced to sue
other responsible parties for contribution to recoup sums paid out in excess of that defendant's
comparative responsibility for the plaintiffs injury. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1078; Manzer,
supra note 40, at 635 n.44.
44 "Where the concurrent negligence of two or more persons combined together results in an
injury to a third person, recovery may be had as to either or all of such wrongdoers: each of such
joint tort feasors is liable for the entire damages ... though only one recovery may be had." Ed-
wards v. Lynch, 175 S.E.2d 632, 635-636 (W. Va. 1970); see also DOBBS, supra note 1, at 413;
Manzer, supra note 40, at 635 n.43.
45 See Manzer, supra note 40, at 635 n.45; Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races":
The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 256 (1990).
46 Manzer, supra note 40, at 635.
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1. Joint and Several Liability Often Requires Minimally Respon-
sible Defendants to Pay More Than Their Fair Share
When one or more co-defendants are insolvent, immune or otherwise
unavailable, the remaining solvent defendants often end up paying much more
than their share of the damages.47 Several cases provide good illustrations of
how joint and several liability works to the detriment of defendants by requiring
them to pay the entire damage award even though they may be minimally re-
sponsible under the principles of comparative negligence.
In Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood48, the plaintiff was injured while riding a
bumper car attraction at Walt Disney World when she was bumped by another
car driven by her fianc6.4 9 At the conclusion of the resulting lawsuit, the jury
returned a verdict that assigned 14% of the fault to the plaintiff, 85% of the fault
to the fianc6, and only 1% of the fault to Walt Disney World.50 However, pur-
suant to the doctrine of joint and several liability, the judge entered judgment
against Walt Disney World for 86% of the damages. 5' Thus Walt Disney
World, a deep pocket defendant, was responsible for paying the entire damage
award minus only the percentage of that award representing the Plaintiffs per-
centage of fault. 52 Florida's intermediate appellate court affirmed the circuit
court's entry of judgment53 and refused to judicially abolish joint and several
liability. 54 That Court did, however, recognize that joint and several liability can
often lead to harsh results for solvent defendants when their co-defendants are
insolvent, immune, or otherwise unavailable.55
Municipalities can also become targeted "deep pockets" in a system of
pure joint and several liability.56 For instance, the city of Honolulu, Hawaii was
47 See sources cited supra note 40; Sanders & Joyce, supra note 45, at 256.
48 489 So.2d 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
49 Id. at 61-62.
50 Id. at 62.
51 Id.
52 Apparently, the fiance was judgment proof. See id.
53 See id. at 63.
54 See id. at 62.
55 "If the codefendant is judgment proof, then under existing law the solvent Defendant must
pay it all." Id. at 62.
56 In fact some political subdivisions in West Virginia were experiencing difficulty in financ-
ing some governmental services due to their ever expanding tort liability. The West Virginia Gov-
ernmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act set forth the West Virginia Legislature's find-
ings regarding that very subject. West Virginia Code section 29-12A-2 provides:
The Legislature finds and declares that the political subdivisions of this state
are unable to procure adequate liability insurance coverage at a reasonable
cost due to: The high cost in defending such claims, the risk of liability be-
yond the affordable coverage, and the inability of political subdivisions to
raise sufficient revenues for the procurement of such coverage without reduc-
ing the quantity and quality of traditional governmental services. Therefore, it
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a targeted "deep pocket" in Kaeo v. Davis. 57 That case involved a speeding, in-
toxicated driver who failed to successfully8 negotiate a double curved section of
highway and slammed into a utility pole. The plaintiff in that case was a pas-
senger who was thrown into the windshield and suffered disabling head inju-
ries.59 In the lawsuit that followed, her guardians sued a number of defendants,
including the driver of the car, the manufacturer of the car, the owner of the
pole, the owner of the drinking establishment where the driver had been drink-
ing, and the city who was responsible for maintaining the road on which the
accident occurred.60 Although the road was apparently well signed with warn-
ings of the curvy and dangerous conditions ahead61, the jury still assessed one
percent of the fault to the city of Honolulu. 62 Because Hawaii observed the rule
of pure joint and several liability at the time this case was litigated 63, the city of
Honolulu ended up being responsible for paying the entire damage award of
well over a half million dollars, despite the fact that the jury had found that it
was only 1% responsible for the plaintiff s injuries.
64
The two preceding cases provide good illustrations of how the princi-
ples of joint and several liability often work to the detriment of defendants by
requiring them to pay more in damages than that which the jury has attributed to
is necessary to establish certain immunities and limitations with regard to the
liability of political subdivisions and their employees, to regulate the insur-
ance industry providing liability insurance to them, and thereby permit such
political subdivisions to provide necessary and needed governmental services
to its citizens within the limits of their available revenues.
W.VA. CODE § 29-12A-2 (2006). The plight experienced by West Virginia's political subdivisions
is not at all uncommon. In fact during the 1980s many insurers of political subdivisions, partly in
response to the risk of liability created by the doctrine of joint and several liability, either raised
premiums by as much as three-hundred to four-hundred and fifty percent or stopped writing liabil-
ity policies for political subdivisions all together. See James Granelli, The Attack on Joint and
Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J. 60, 61 (1985).
57 719 P.2d 387 (Haw. 1986).
58 The driver of the car admitted that he was traveling at least five miles per hour in excess of
the speed limit and twice the suggested safe speed before he applied the brakes. Id. at 389. More-
over, a passenger in the car testified in her deposition that the driver had consumed several alco-
holic beverages and was "feeling good" when they left the drinking establishment. Id.
59 See id. at 389.
60 See id at 390. This also illustrates the shot gun pleading technique discussed later, often
utilized by plaintiff's attorneys to ensure full recovery for his client. See supra Part H A.
61 "The sharp bends in the road there are marked by several road signs, including one indicat-
ing the presence of a curve and another advising a driving speed of 15 miles per hour .... I d. at
389.
62 Id. at 390.
63 Id.
64 Only the driver and the city remained as defendants at the time of trial and the driver could
not be located at the time of the trial. Id. The jury returned a verdict for $725,000 reduced by
sums of $99,316 and $5,000 previously paid in settlement by Hawaiian Electric Company and
Ford Motor Company. Id.
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their negligence. In fact, minimally responsible defendants often end up bearing
the entire burden for the plaintiffs injuries simply because they are capable of
paying a large damage award and their co-defendants are not.65 In a case where
there is but one plaintiff and one defendant, the plaintiff bears the risk of an
insolvent defendant and thus, the possibility that he may have to carry the entire
burden of his losses. 66 Where another defendant is added, who happens to be
solvent, there is no logical reason to shift the risk of the insolvent defendant and
the burden of all of the plaintiffs losses to the solvent defendant. 67 Where joint
and several liability results in this arbitrary shifting of risks and burdens, the
doctrine in unfair.
2. Joint and Several Liability Often Requires "Deep Pocket" De-
fendants to Stand in as Social Insurers Against the Losses Suf-
fered by the Plaintiff
Joint and several liability often results in situations where minimally re-
sponsible "deep pocket" defendants become highly sought after targets whom
the plaintiff can use as social insurers from which to collect substantial sums of
money, regardless of the percentage of fault that has been attributed to their
actions.68 This is so because a jury's finding of a small percentage of negli-
gence on behalf of a defendant can effectively mean a finding of one hundred
percent under the principles of joint and several liability.69 Moreover, some
suggest that it is quite easy to get a jury to "parcel out small portions of liability
without significant evidence to support the verdict" simply to insure that a plain-
tiff is able to collect the entire damage award. 70 This may be, as some studies
suggest, because wealthy defendants such as corporations, municipalities, and
professionals often tend to be the object of "jury scorn."'71 Thus, the principles
of joint and several liability, when combined with the jury's natural scorn for
"deep pocket" defendants, allow plaintiffs attorneys to use minimally responsi-
ble "deep pocket" defendants as a form of social insurance or social safety net to
65 See sources cited supra notes 40, 47; Richard N. Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under
Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REv. 343, 343 (1980).
6 Clare Elizabeth Krumlauf, Ohio's New Modified Joint and Several Liability Laws: A Fair
Compromise For Competing Parties and Public Policy Interests, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 333, 350
(2006).
67 Id. at 350-35 1; Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579, 585-586 (N.M. 1982).
68 See Twerski, supra note 1, at 1139; ATr'Y GEN. REPORT, supra note 3, at 76; ATr'Y GEN.
REPORT UPDATE, supra note 3, at 64.
69 Id.
70 Twerski, supra note 1, at 1139. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 45, at 256; ATr'y GEN.
REPORT UPDATE, supra note 3, at 76 (suggesting that defendants are often hit with liability even
though their responsibility for the injury is not readily apparent).
71 See Twerski, supra note 1, at 1140.
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compensate plaintiffs who were injured, for the most part, by the negligence of
another person or entity."
Even joint and several liability supporters implicitly admit that "deep
pocket" defendants are being used as social insurers when they attempt to justify
the doctrine by arguing that it is preferable to make the "deep pocket" pay in-
stead of the plaintiff because the "deep pocket" can afford to pay. 73 The ration-
ale of this argument is obviously unsound. American tort law attempts to work
corrective justice between the individual parties in any particular dispute.74 In
other words, claims are individualistic75 and tort law seeks to right wrongs be-
tween the individual plaintiffs who are injured and the individual defendants
who are responsible for the injury.76 Thus, if A invades the rights of B, then an
adjustment must be made in favor of B for the loss for which A was responsi-
ble.7 7 Stated another way, A must restore what he has taken from B. Compara-
tive negligence provides a way to determine what A must restore based on per-
centages of fault. 78 Thus, because joint and several liability often requires de-
fendants to step in as social insurers and pay the entire judgment in order to
achieve some broad social goal of guaranteeing most Plaintiffs a full recovery,
72 See Twerski, supra note 1, at 1139 ("Municipalities, corporations, and major institutions
stand as the defendant of last resort"); Peter H. Schuck, The New Judicial Ideology of Tort Law, in
THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 4, 12-14 (Walter Olson
ed., Capital City Press 1988) (suggesting that liability expanding tort doctrines, such as joint and
several liability, seek to serve broad social goals such as wealth spreading); Law Firm of Sidley
and Austin, The Need for Legislative Reform of the Tort System: A Report on the Liability Crisis
from Affected Organizations, 10 HAMLINE L. REV. 345, 384 (1987) (suggesting that the tort sys-
tem, including joint and several liability, has imposed a kind of social insurance upon "deep
pocket" defendants).
73 See Shirley Brantingham, Civil Justice Reform: The Continuing Search for Balance, 10
HAMLINE L. REV. 387, 403 (1987); Macchiarola, supra note 23, at vii.
74 See Manzer, supra note 40, at 640; Schuck, supra note 72, at 12; Kenneth S. Abraham,
What Is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of Contemporary Tort Reform, 51 MD. L. REV. 172, 173
(1992) ("At the core of our traditional conception of a tort claim are two notions: the right to
individualized determination of the defendant's liability, and the right to custom-tailored compen-
sation for the actual loss suffered by the claimant."); DOBBS, supra note 1, at 14 ("The most tradi-
tional elements of tort law do not in fact aim at a redistribution of goods but are concerned with
corrective justice instead."); Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note 3, at 1179 ("Even those who
favor.., social welfare views acknowledge the historical dominance of the corrective justice view
of tort law.").
75 "Every claim is unique because it is about individual human beings, or at least individual
corporations acting in particular circumstances." DOBBS, supra note 1, at 13.
76 See id.; Manzer, supra note 40, at 639-640; Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective
Justice: A Pragmatic Justification For Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2350-52
(1990).
77 See Wells, supra note 76, at 2350.
78 See Pearson, supra note 65, at 344. Under contributory negligence, there was no basis for
apportioning liability among the defendants. Thus, it followed that if all the Defendants caused
the harm, then they all ought to be liable for all of it. Id; see also Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Sup-
ply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579, 585-86 (N.M. 1982).
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the doctrine is violative of corrective justice upon which much of tort law is
based.79
3. Joint and Several Liability Exposes "Deep Pocket" Defendants
to Abusive Litigation Practices Such As "Shotgun Pleading"
Moreover, the doctrine of joint and several liability is unfair to defen-
dants, especially those with "deep pockets," because it often subjects them to
abusive litigation practices employed by plaintiffs' attorneys in order to guaran-
tee that their client receives the largest award possible and that some entity is
joined in the lawsuit who can pay that judgment.80  One of the more popular
abusive litigation practices employed by many plaintiffs' attorneys is that
known as "shotgun" pleading.8' The practice of "shotgun" pleading' involves
the joinder of minimally responsible entities in lawsuits where they probably
wouldn't otherwise be joined, in the absence of joint and several liability, due to
their mere tangential involvement in the events in question. 82 Plaintiffs' attor-
neys engage in "shotgun" pleading because they know that if they join enough
"deep pockets," they are likely to be able to convince the jury to assign at least
1% responsibility to one of them,83 assuring that, because of the principles of
joint and several liability, at least one party will be available to pay the entirety
of a potentially high damage award. 84 Therefore, joint and several liability re-
sults in the perpetuation of this abusive litigation practice, which leads to injus-
79 See Manzer, supra note 40, at 639-41. "The most traditional elements of tort law do not in
fact aim at a redistribution of goods but are concerned with corrective justice instead." DOBBS,
supra note 1, at 14.
80 See Arr'y GEN. REPORT, supra note 3, at 64; ATr'Y GEN. REPORT UPDATE, supra note 3, at
76; Steenson, supra note 1, at 485.
81 Id. The phrase shotgun pleading comes from the analogy to the firing of a shotgun where
hundreds of pellets are sprayed from the shotgun shell cartridge in the hopes that it will hit some-
thing.
82 These minimally responsible entities are joined in order to take advantage of the greater
financial resources of these entities as compared to the other defendants in the litigation. See
Steenson, supra note 1, at 485. This concern is greater in cases involving municipalities and other
governmental entities. See id. For example, in the case of Kaeo v. Davis, an intoxicated driver
failed to successfully negotiate a double curved section of a highway and slammed into a utility
pole, seriously injuring one of his passengers. 719 P.2d 387, 388 (Haw. 1986). In the lawsuit that
followed, the Plaintiff joined a "host of identified and unidentified defendants," including the
manufacturer of the car, the owner of the pole, the owner of the drinking establishment where the
driver had been drinking, and the city who was responsible for maintaining the road on which the
accident occurred. Id. at 390; see also ATr'Y GEN. REPORT, supra note 3, at 64; ATr'Y GEN.
REPORT UPDATE, supra note 3, at 76.
83 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
84 See AT'y GEN. REPORT, supra note 3, at 64; Alr'Y GEN. REPORT UPDATE, supra note 3, at
76; Sanders & Joyce, supra note 45, at 256; Twerski, supra note 1, at 1139.
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tice for defendants, particularly those who are perceived to have "deep pock-
ets. 85
4. Joint and Several Liability Forces Defendants to Bear the Entire
Costs of Risk Creating Activities Which Society Has Immu-
nized
Where there is but one solvent defendant amenable to suit amongst mul-
tiple possible tortfeasors, joint and several liability often forces that defendant
to bear the cost of many legislatively immunized activities.86 Many oppo-
nents of joint and several liability point to the insolvency of many defendants
as the reason why their solvent co-defendants are often required to pay more
than their fair share of damages.87 Professor Alan Twerski, on the other hand,
suggests that the real culprit may actually be the actual or implied immunities
enjoyed by some classes of defendants.88 There are numerous examples of
these sorts of immunities. For example, employers are generally immunized
from liability for workplace injuries under worker's compensation statutes.
89
Governmental entities often enjoy many statutory immunities as well. 90
85 See id.
86 See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 45, at 1143-45.
87 See id. at 1143; see e.g., Manzer, supra note 40, at 644.
88 Twerski, supra note 1, at 1143. "The language of the joint and several debate is studded
with references to the insolvent defendant. Although this defendant may exist in theory, it is not
the culprit that has caused all the difficulty." Id.
89 For example, W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 provides, in part, that
[a]ny employer subject to this chapter who subscribes and pays into the work-
ers' compensation fund the premiums provided by this chapter or who elects
to make direct payments of compensation as provided in this section is not li-
able to respond in damages at common law or by statute for the injury or
death of any employee, however occurring, after so subscribing or electing,
and during any period in which the employer is not in default in the payment
of the premiums or direct payments and has complied fully with all other pro-
visions of this chapter. Continuation in the service of the employer shall be
considered a waiver by the employee and by the parents of any minor em-
ployee of the right of action as aforesaid, which the employee or his or her
parents would otherwise have .. "
W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 (2006). Thus, absent "deliberate intention" by the employer, that employer
is immune from any liability for workplace injuries. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (2006).
90 For example, Article VI, Section 35 of the West Virginia Constitution states, in pertinent
part, that "[t]he State of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any court of law or equity
.W. VA  CONST. art. VI, § 35. However, the State of West Virginia's immunity has been
limited by judicial decision. For instance, Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia Board of
Regents held that where the state has procured liability insurance, the insurance company is pro-
hibited from asserting the State's immunity for liability up to and under the policy's limits. 310
S.E.2d 675, 688 (W. Va. 1983). The political subdivisions of a state often enjoy certain immuni-
ties as well. For example, in West Virginia, the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform
Act "limit[s] liability of political subdivisions and provide[s] immunity to political subdivisions in
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In addition to the explicit statutory immunities that exist in most juris-
dictions, some classes of defendants also enjoy immunities that are implied by
legislative enactments. 91 For instance, minimum liability insurance limits ef-
fectively immunize drivers, who have only the meager minimum limits,
92
from any liability above and beyond those limits. 93 Similarly, "when states
permit high risk repairers to operate with thin capitalization and no insurance,
they effectively immunize these defendants from liability. 9 4
Where a co-defendant enjoys one of these express or implied immuni-
ties, joint and several liability would transfer the entire costs of these immuni-
ties to third parties (solvent and available co-defendants) who may be only
minimally at fault.95 However, the more equitable method would be to spread
certain instances .. " W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-1 (2006). Finally, the Federal Government is also
immunized from liability in certain instances. For example, The Federal Tort Claims Act provides
that the jurisdiction granted to hear tort claims against the Federal Government shall not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care,
in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary func-
tion or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). This provision is commonly referred to as the Federal Government's
discretionary immunity. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 697.
91 See Twerski, supra note 1, at 1143-45.*
92 The State of West Virginia only requires that motor vehicle owners be able to provide
[p]roof of ability to respond in damages for liability, on account of accident..
• arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehi-
cle ... in the amount of twenty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or
death of one person in any one accident, and. .. in the amount of forty thou-
sand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in
any one accident, and in the amount of ten thousand dollars because of injury
to or destruction of property of others in any one accident.
W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-2 (2006).
93 "Minimum liability limits are, in fact, maximum recovery amounts." Twerski, supra note 1,
at 1144.
94 Twerski, supra note 1, at 1144. Professor Twerski offers the following example to illustrate
this concept:
An aircraft manufacturer is sued following an accident for failing to design a
redundancy system into the aircraft. Evidence indicates that the cause of the
crash was negligent repair of the aircraft by a local aircraft repair outfit. The
repairer carries no insurance and has no significant assets.
Twerski, supra note 1, at 1143-44.
95 See id. at 1144. A good illustration of this concept can be found in Miller v. Monongahela
Power Co., 403 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Mallet v. Pickens, 522
S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1999). There, the Court opined that in a case where the plaintiff was 10% at
fault, the third-party tortfeasor 1% at fault, and the employer exempted by statutory immunity, the
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these costs among the general public.96 The former alternative of wholly
transferring the costs of the immunized activity to the third-party tortfeasor
does not properly deter harmful activity or internalize costs because, under
such a system, "[p]arties who are either wholly or partially immune simply do
not have the proper incentive to modify their behavior., 97 Thus, it is neither
logical nor fair to ask third-party tortfeasors, who are minimally at fault, to
bear the entire burden of damages resulting from activity which society has
chosen to immunize or activity for which society has effectively set the ap-
propriate amount of compensation as reflected by, for example, minimum li-
ability insurance policy limits or worker's compensation benefits. 98
5. The Unfairness of Joint and Several Liability Cannot Be Justi-
fied
As pointed out in the preceding discussion, the doctrine of joint and
several liability can often result in a substantial amount of unfairness and injus-
tice for solvent defendants in cases where his co-defendants are insolvent, im-
mune, or otherwise unavailable. 99 Many joint and several liability supporters
attempt to justify these injustices by arguing that it is better that an at-fault de-
fendant pay the entire damage award, regardless of his percentage of fault,
rather than leaving an innocent plaintiff without compensation. l° This argu-
ment may have been valid in the days of contributory negligence because, in the
days of contributory negligence, a recovering plaintiff was always innocent.'01
But most American jurisdictions have long since moved to a system of com-
parative negligence. 102 Under a comparative negligence scheme, a plaintiff mayrecover even if he was negligent in some way. 10 3 Thus, because it is possible
96 See Twerski, supra note 1, at 1144.
97 See id. at n.63.
98 See id. at 1132-33; Aaron D. Twerski, The Baby Swallowed the Bathwater: A Rejoinder to
Professor Wright, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1989).
99 See discussion supra Part III.A. 1-4.
100 See Wright, Throwing Out the Baby, supra note 26, at 1154.
101 Under contributory negligence, even the slightest negligence on behalf of the Plaintiff was a
complete and total bar to his recovery. See, e.g., Morton v. Baber, 190 S.E. 767, 771-72 (W. Va.
1937); Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.2d 18, 28 (W. Va. 1961); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256
S.E.2d 879, 882 (W. Va. 1979); see also DOBBS, supra note 1, at 494; Wright, Logic and Fair-
ness, supra note 26, at 45 n.3.
102 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 503-04; Wright, supra note 3, at 45; Pearson, supra note 65, at
343; Thomas R. Trenkner, Modern Development of Comparative Negligence Doctrine Having
Applicability to Negligence Actions Generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339, § 2(a) (Westlaw 2006);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17 reporters' note, cmt. a, tbl.
(2000) (Pure Joint and Several Liability Jurisdictions); Mutter, supra note 16, at 199-200; McIn-
tyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992).
103 See Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 885; McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 57; Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037
(Alaska 1975); DOBBS, supra note 1, at 503-04.
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that today's plaintiff can recover damages even though he may not be com-
pletely innocent, this argument loses its rationale.1
°4
Professor Richard Wright has attempted to justify joint and several li-
ability in a slightly different way. Although his argument is essentially the same
"innocent plaintiff' argument, he attempts to strengthen this ill-fated argument
by tying it to principles of causation. 105 He has argued that it is not unfair to ask
a minimally responsible defendant to pay an entire damage award because that
defendant was an actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's entire injury.' °6
Thus, Wright argues, because a defendant must be an actual but-for and proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiffs injury, the plaintiff would not have been injured if
the defendant had not behaved tortiously.107 The simple fact that someone else's
behavior was also an actual and proximate cause of the injury does not diminish
the defendant's responsibility, according to Professor Wright.'
0 8
The above referenced argument put forth by Professor Wright seems
logical and sound if one were to assume that the plaintiff is always innocent.
But because most jurisdictions have moved to comparative negligence, plaintiffs
who are "comparatively" negligent are often allowed to recover at least a partial
damage award. Where this is the case, the plaintiff has been found to be negli-
gent in bringing about the injury in just the same way as the various defendants
have." 9 Thus, the same principles of causation that apply to the negligent de-
fendant also apply to the contributorily negligent plaintiff.10 Therefore, where
it is determined that the plaintiff was comparatively negligent, he too was a nec-
essary and proximate cause of his injury."' Because the plaintiff and all of the
104 See AT'Y GEN. REPORT UPDATE, supra note 3, at 76.
105 See Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note 3, at 1186.
106 See Wright, Logic and Fairness, supra note 26, at 54; Wright, Allocating Liability, supra
note 3, at 1179-93.
107 See Wright, Logic and Fairness, supra note 93, at 54-55; Wright, Allocating Liability, supra
note 3, at 1179-93.
108 See id.
19 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 495; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 3 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
110 See Divita v. Atl. Trucking Co., 40 S.E.2d 324, 333 (W. Va. 1946); W. Constr. Co. v. Atd.
Coast Line R.R. Co., 113 S.E. 672, 673 (N.C. 1922); Hughes v. Atlanta Steel Co., 71 S.E. 728,
728-29 (Ga. 1911); Craig v. Greenbelt Consumer Servs., Inc., 222 A.2d 836, 836 (Md. 1966);
DOBBS, supra note 1, at 496-97; RESTATEMENT § 3 cmt. b.
H The West Virginia Supreme Court expressed this maxim as follows:
If it appears that plaintiff was guilty of acts of negligence which 'proximately
contributed' to the damage complained of, plaintiff is barred of recovery. The
term proximate cause has been defined as that cause 'without which the acci-
dent would not have occurred.' It necessarily follows that the term proxi-
mately contributed is of similar import. Therefore, we are called upon to as-
certain if plaintiff ... [was] guilty of negligent acts 'without which the acci-
dent would not have occurred.'
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defendants are necessary and proximate causes of the plaintiff's injury, all of the
parties are on the same causal footing, in that the injury producing accident
would not have occurred but for the negligence of each liable party. This in-
cludes the partially at fault plaintiff. When this is the case, it is no fairer to ask
the solvent defendant to pay the entire judgment than it is to ask the plaintiff to
bear the risk that all or part of his damage award will be uncollectible."
2
Wright tries to solve this defect in his reasoning by distinguishing the nature of
the plaintiff's responsibility from that of the defendant's responsibility."
3
Wright argues that the comparatively negligent plaintiff should be treated dif-
ferently than the negligent defendant because the plaintiff has exposed only
himself to risk and the defendant has exposed others to risk."l4 However, the
fact remains that a finding of contributory negligence reflects the jury's finding
that the injury producing accident would not have occurred absent the plaintiff's
negligence, just as it would not have occurred absent the defendant's negli-
gence." 5 Because the plaintiff was also responsible for the entirety of the inju-
ries, there is no reason to entirely insulate him from the risk of insolvent or un-
available tortfeasors, while shifting the entirety of that burden to the remaining
solvent defendants." 6 Therefore, at least where the plaintiff has been compara-
Divita, 40 S.E.2d at 330 (citing Anderson v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 81 S.E. 579, 580 (W. Va.
1914)); see also W. Constr. Co., 113 S.E. at 673; Hughes, 71 S.E. at 728-29; Craig, 222 A.2d at
836; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 496-97; RESTATEMENT § 3 cmt. b.
112 See Manzer, supra note 40, at 645-46; Scheske, supra note 5, at 653.
113 See Wright, Logic and Fairness, supra note 26, at 76-77.
114 See id. Others have also attempted to make this distinction. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 1,
at 497; RESTATEMENT § 3 cmt. b.
115 See Divita, 40 S.E.2d at 330; W Constr. Co., 113 S.E. at 673; Hughes, 71 S.E. at 728-29;
Craig, 222 A.2d at 836; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 496-97; RESTATEMENT § 3 cmt. b; Gary T.
Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 724
(1978).
116 Although the distinction made between the moral implications of the plaintiff's negligence
and the defendant's negligence may be warranted, it does not justify shifting the entire cost of
insolvent or unavailable co-defendants to the solvent defendants. Although the plaintiff's conduct
may initially exposed only himself to risk, it eventually results in risk to others. While comment-
ing on the rule of contributory negligence, one commentator has made this same point in the fol-
lowing way:
[t]he plaintiff's original act of contributory negligence may not have been
morally improper, since it created a risk only to the plaintiff himself. When
that risk eventuates in an injury to the plaintiff, however, and when the plain-
tiff then seeks to collect in tort for that injury against a negligent defendant, at
the time of this lawsuit the harm involved in the plaintiff's original conduct
"reaches" the defendant, another person.... Nevertheless, that accident would
never have occurred had the plaintiff himself not behaved in a foolish way. In
these circumstances, it would be basically be unfair for the law to ignore en-
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tively negligent, Professor Wright fails to sufficiently justify the unfairness that
often results from joint and several liability.
In summation, joint and several liability often results in unfairness and
injustice to solvent defendants, especially those who are perceived to have
"deep pockets." For instance, joint and several liability often requires a solvent
defendant to pay far more than his fair share of damages. Moreover, the doctrine
of joint and several liability often requires minimally responsible solvent defen-
dants to stand in as social insurance against all losses suffered by the plaintiff
regardless of his minimal fault. Further, the doctrine often subjects defendants
to abusive litigation practices such as "shotgun" pleading, where minimally re-
sponsible defendants are joined in order to take advantage of their substantial
wealth compared to that of the other defendants in the case. Additionally, the
doctrine is unfair because it asks solvent defendants to bear the entire burden of
damages resulting from activities which society has either explicitly or implic-
itly immunized or activities for which society has essentially set maximum li-
ability limits. Finally, the most common arguments that supporters use to jus-
tify the injustice of joint and several liability cannot, in fact, justify those injus-
tices, especially where the plaintiff has been comparatively negligent.
B. Pure Joint and Several Liability is Inconsistent With the Principles of
Comparative Negligence
The traditional rule at common law was that a plaintiff's negligence, no
matter how slight, was a complete bar to his recovery.' 17 The rule was adopted
in many American jurisdictions 1 8 and became the rule in most of those jurisdic-
tions prior to the 1960s and 1970s." 9 However, due in large part to its harsh
results, the rule was frequently attacked by many commentators. 120  Most
Schwartz, supra note 115, at 724-25. Likewise, in the joint and several liability context, it would
be unfair for the law to ignore the Plaintiffs conduct by imposing all of the risk of the insolvent or
unavailable co-defendant on the remaining solvent defendants.
117 See Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.); see also DOBBS, supra note 1,
at 494; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1965); 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 797
(2006); Scheske, supra note 5, at 629-30; Schwartz, supra note 115, at 697; Lawrence C. George
& Vincent S. Walkowiak, Blame and Reparation in Pure Comparative Negligence: The Multi-
Party Action, 8 Sw. U. L. REv. 1 n.1 (1976); John J. Haugh, Comparative Negligence: A Reform
Long Overdue, 49 OR. L. REv. 38, 38 (1969).
118 See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 296 (1850). See also Schwartz, supra note 115,
at 697; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 504.
19 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 494, 503-04; Schwartz, supra note 115, at 697; Scheske, supra
note 5, at 628-29; Fleming James, Jr., Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 691 (1953);
William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 466 (1953).
120 See Ray J. Aiken, Proportioning Comparative Negligence-Problems of Theory and Special
Verdict Formulation, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 293 (1970); George & Walkowiak, supra note 117;
Haugh, supra note 117; James, supra note 119; Schwartz, supra note 115; Robert A. Leflar, The
Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1947); Frank E. Maloney, From
Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135 (1958);
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thought the rule to be extreme because it completely barred a plaintiff's recov-
ery if he was even slightly negligent, despite the fact that the defendant's negli-
gence might have been quite severe. 21  The criticisms of the harsh all or nothing
rule of joint and several liability eventually led a majority of jurisdictions to
abandon contributory negligence and move to a system of comparative negli-
gence. 22 Although comparative negligence exists in two basic forms-"pure"
and "modified"123-the gist of the doctrine is that plaintiffs are now allowed to
recover even if they have been negligent themselves. 24 Two of the main
themes that seem to run through the concept of comparative negligence are a
preference for proportional allocation of liability
25 and fairness.126
see also Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 882 (W. Va. 1979). Although the
dominance of contributory negligence during it reign as the majority rule is unquestionable, it
seems that many courts began to realize that the rule often lead to harsh results, leading them to
create various exceptions under which the plaintiff could still recover despite the fact that he was
contributorily negligent. See Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 882-83; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 498-503;
Scheske, supra note 5, at 629. For instance, many courts refused to apply the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence where the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. See, e.g.,
Barr v. Curry, 71 S.E.2d 313, 318 (W. Va. 1952); see also Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 882; DOBBS,
supra note 1, at 499; Scheske, supra note 5, at 629; Robert T. Donley, Observations on Last Clear
Chance in West Virginia, 37 W. VA. L. Q. 362 (1931). Courts also allowed a plaintiff to recover,
despite his contributory negligence, where the defendant had acted in a intentional, wanton, or
reckless manner. See, e.g., Stone v. Rudolph, 32 S.E.2d 742, 749 (W. Va. 1944); see also DOBBS,
supra note 1, at 498. Finally, many courts held that the rule of contributory negligence was not
available to the defendant where he was under a statutory duty to protect the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
Pitzer v. M. D. Tomkies & Sons, 67 S.E.2d 437, 442 (W. Va. 1951); see also DOBBS, supra note
1, at 500; Scheske, supra note 5, at 629.
121 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 494.
122 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7 reporters' note, cmt. a
(2000); DOBBS, supra note 1, at 504; Pearson, supra note 65, at 343 n.2; Scheske, supra note 5, at
630; Wright, Logic and Fairness, supra note 26, at 45. In fact, as of 2000, only five jurisdictions
continued to adhere to the rule of contributory negligence. See RESTATEMENT § 7 cmt. a.
123 See RESTATEMENT § 7 reporters' note, cmt. a.; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 505; Pearson, supra
note 65, at 344. The "pure" system of comparative negligence allows a plaintiff to recover regard-
less of his percentage of comparative negligence. See RESTATEMENT § 7 cmt. a; DOBBS, supra
note 1, at 505. However, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by his percentage of comparative
negligence. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 505. Similarly, the "modified" system of comparative
negligence also reduces the plaintiff's recovery by his percentage of comparative negligence. Id.
However, under the "modified" system, the plaintiff is barred from recovery if his comparative
negligence reaches a particular threshold (typically either 50% or 51%). Id.
124 See RESTATEMENT § 7 reporters' note, cmt. a (2000); DOBBS, supra note 1, at 505; Pearson,
supra note 65, at 344.
125 See discussion infra Part Ill.B.1.
126 See discussion infra Part ILI.B.2.
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1. Joint and Several Liability Is Inconsistent With the Preference
of Proportionate Liability Allocation Embodied In Comparative
Negligence
Both contributory negligence and joint and several liability were based
on the notion that a jury could not compare or apportion fault among and be-
tween the parties.127  Comparative negligence, on the other hand, provides a
basis for apportioning losses between negligent plaintiffs and negligent defen-
dants based on the principle that liability should be proportionate to negli-
gence.1 28 In other words, comparative negligence recognizes that it is preferable
to apportion liability among various negligent parties (plaintiffs and defendants
alike) and it provides a method with which to do it.' 29 Conversely, joint and
several liability requires a defendant to pay damages out of proportion to his
percentage of negligence, even requiring some defendants to pay the entire
judgment despite the fact that he may only be responsible for only a portion of
it. 30 Because comparative negligence recognizes that losses can be apportioned
and provides a manner by which to accomplish that task, it cannot be denied that
the concept of comparative negligence represents a preference to allocate losses
proportionately. Taking this into consideration, one can see that joint and sev-
eral liability is inconsistent with the proportionate loss apportionment ideas of
comparative negligence.1
31
2. Joint and Several Liability Is Inconsistent With The Notions of
Fairness Behind Comparative Negligence
The rejection of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negli-
gence was based primarily on notions of fairness. 132 For instance, one of the
primary arguments for moving toward a system of comparative negligence was
that it was unfair for a Plaintiff who was only minimally responsible for his own
injury to be barred completely from recovery and bear the total financial burden
127 See Mutter, supra note 16, at 204.
128 See Pearson, supra note 65, at 344. Under contributory negligence, there was no basis for
apportioning liability among the defendants. Thus, it followed that if all the defendants caused the
harm, then they all ought to be liable for all of it. Id.; see also Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply,
Inc., 646 P.2d 579, 585-86 (N.M. 1982).
129 See Pearson, supra note 65, at 362; Krumlauf, supra note 66, at 348; John Scott Hickman,
Efficiency, Fairness, and Common Sense: The Case for One Action as to Percentage of Fault in
Comparative Negligence Jurisdictions That Have Abolished or Modified Joint and Several Liabil-
ity, 48 VAND. L. REV. 739, 746 (1995); Damon Ball, A Reexamination of Joint and Several Liabil-
ity Under a Comparative Negligence System, 18 ST. MARY'S L. J. 891, 898 (1987).
130 Pearson, supra note 65, at 362.
131 See id. 362; Krumlauf, supra note 66, at 348; Hickman, supra note 129, at 746; Ball, supra
note 129, at 898; Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla. 1987).
132 See Krumlauf, supra note 66, at 348.
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of all of his losses. 13 3 The recognition that this was overly harsh on plaintiffs
led many jurisdictions to abandon contributory negligence and move to a system
of comparative negligence, 134 which did not require a plaintiff to bear the entire
burden of his injury where he was only minimally at fault.' 35 Thus, the move to
comparative negligence represented the recognition that tort law should strive to
eliminate blatant unfairness such as that attendant in forcing minimally respon-
sible parties to bear the entire burden of losses for which they were only mini-
mally responsible.
Just as it is unfair to require that a minimally responsible plaintiff to
bear the entire burden of his injuries, it is also unfair to require a minimally re-
sponsible defendant to bear the total financial burden for those injuries. 136 Be-
cause joint and several liability often leads to just this kind of result, 137 it is in-
consistent with the notions of fairness that, in large part, provide the underpin-
ning for comparative negligence regimes. 38 With this in mind, one can see the
inconsistency that exists when a particular jurisdiction chooses to side with fair-
ness to plaintiffs by adopting comparative negligence, while ignoring the un-
fairness that defendants must bear as a result of joint and several liability.
TV. WEST VIRGINIA CODE SECTION 55-7-24
On April 9, 2005, the West Virginia Legislature passed West Virginia
Code section 55-7-24, which removes West Virginia from the dwindling hand-
ful of jurisdictions that recognize a system of pure joint and several liability for
apportioning damages in lawsuits that involve multiple tortfeasors who cause a
133 See Id.
134 See Id. at 348-49; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7 re-
porters' note, cmt. a (2000); DOBBS, supra note 1, at 504; Pearson, supra note 65, at 343 n.2;
Scheske, supra note 5, at 630; Wright, Logic and Fairness, supra note 26, at 45.
'35 See Krumlauf, supra note 66, at 348-49; RESTATEMENT § 7 reporters' note, cmt. a; DOBBS,
supra note 1, at 505; Pearson, supra note 65, at 344.
136 See Krumlauf, supra note 66, at 348.
137 See discussion supra Part III.
138 Some courts have recognized this fact. For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court has
stated that comparative negligence:
[rienders the doctrine of joint and several liability obsolete. Our adoption of
comparative fault is due largely to considerations of fairness: the contributory
negligence doctrine unjustly allowed the entire loss to be borne by a negligent
Plaintiff, notwithstanding that the Plaintiffs fault was minor in comparison to
Defendant's. Having thus adopted a rule more closely linking liability and
fault, it would be inconsistent to simultaneously retain a rule, joint and several
liability, which may fortuitously impose a degree of liability that is out of all
proportion to fault.
McIntyre v. Ballentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992); see also Wright, Logic and Fairness,
supra note 26, at 46.
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single indivisible injury.139 Although West Virginia Code section 55-7-24 does
not completely abandon joint and several liability, it does represent a significant
modification of the doctrine. 40 The statute's major substantive provisions in-
139 See W. VA. CODE § 55-7-24 (2000). The trend over the last several decades has been to
move away from pure joint and several liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17 reporters' note cmt. a (2005). In fact, at the turn of the century,
only fifteen jurisdictions still retained a system of pure joint and several liability. Id.
140 West Virginia Code section 55-7-24 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) In any cause of action involving the tortious conduct of more than one de-
fendant, the trial court shall:
(1) Instruct the jury to determine, or, if there is no jury, find, the total amount
of damages sustained by the claimant and the proportionate fault of each of
the parties in the litigation at the time the verdict is rendered; and
(2) Enter judgment against each defendant found to be liable on the basis of
the rules of joint and several liability, except that if any defendant is thirty
percent or less at fault, then that defendant's liability shall be several and not
joint and he or she shall be liable only for the damages attributable to him or
her, except as otherwise provided in this section.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (2), subsection (a) of this section, the rules of
joint and several liability shall apply to:
(1) Any party who acted with the intention of inflicting injury or damage;
(2) Any party who acted in concert with another person as part of a common
plan or design resulting in harm;
(3) Any party who negligently or willfully caused the unlawful emission, dis-
posal or spillage of a toxic or hazardous substance; or
(4) Any party strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of a defective prod-
uct.
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (2), subsection (a) of this section, if a claim-
ant through good faith efforts is unable to collect from a liable defendant, the
claimant may, not later than six months after judgment becomes final through
lapse of time for appeal or through exhaustion of appeal, whichever occurs
later, move for reallocation of any uncollectible amount among the other par-
ties in the litigation at the time the verdict is rendered.
(1) Upon the filing of such a motion, the court shall determine whether all or
part of a defendant's proportionate share of the verdict is uncollectible from
that defendant and shall reallocate such uncollectible amount among the other
parties in the litigation at the time the verdict is rendered, including a claimant
at fault according to their percentages of fault: Provided, That the court shall
not reallocate to any defendant an uncollectible amount greater than that de-
fendant's percentage of fault multiplied by such uncollectible amount.
(2) If such a motion is filed, the parties may conduct discovery on the issue of
collectability prior to a hearing on such motion.
(3) Any order regarding such motion shall be entered within one hundred
twenty days after the date of filing such a motion.
(4) A defendant's share of the obligation to a claimant may not be increased
by reason of reallocation under this subsection if:
(A) The percentage of fault of that defendant is equal to or less than the
claimant's percentage of fault; or
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clude a minimum threshold of liability for joint and several liability applica-
tion,14 1 a reallocation of uncollectible portions of damage awards amongst the
parties, 42 and exceptions which exempt certain actions from the statute.1
43
A. Minimum Liability Thresholds
West Virginia Code section 55-7-24 provides that, in any action involv-
ing multiple tortfeasors, the jury or judge must first determine the total amount
of damages suffered by the plaintiff and then determine the proportionate fault
of each of the parties. 44 Next, the judge must enter judgment against each de-
fendant according to the rules of joint and several liability. '4 If any defendant's
fault is equal to or less than thirty percent, however, then that defendant is no
longer jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs entire damage award under
the statute. 146 Thus, where a defendant is less than thirty percent at fault the
plaintiff can only enforce the judgment against that defendant for his propor-
tionate share of the damages, subject to certain subsequent provisions in the
statute. 47 The statute does, however, allow a court to reallocate any uncollect-
ible damages amongst all parties to the litigation, including the plaintiff, accord-
ing to their respective percentages of comparative fault. 148 On the other hand,
the Act limits the reallocation to those defendants who are determined by the
jury to be more than ten percent at fault. 149
(B) The percentage of fault of that defendant is less than ten percent.
(5) A party whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution
and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
(6) If any defendant's share of the obligation to a claimant is not increased by
reason of the application of subdivision (4) of this subsection, the amount of
that defendant's share of the reallocation shall be considered uncollectible and
shall be reallocated among all other parties who are not subject to subdivision
four of this subsection, including the claimant, in the same manner as other-
wise provided this subsection.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-24 (2005).
141 See § 55-7-24 (a)(2), (c)(4)(B).
142 See § 55-7-24 (c)(1)-(6).
143 See § 55-7-24 (b)(1)-(4).
144 See § 55-7-24 (a)(1).
145 See § 55-7-24 (a)(2).
146 Id.
147 Section 55-7-24 (c) subjects defendants who are ten percent or more at fault to a reallocation
of the uncollectible portions of the judgment according to the parties' percentages of comparative
fault. W. VA. CODE § 55-7-24 (c)(1)-(4)(b).
148 See § 55-7-24 (b).
149 See § 55-7-24 (c)(4)(B).
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B. Reallocation of Uncollectible Shares
In the event that the plaintiff is not able to collect from any particular
defendant due to insolvency, immunity or any other particular reason, the plain-
tiff is not without redress under section 55-7-24. In those cases, the plaintiff
may move the court to reallocate among the parties, including the claimant, any
portion of the damages which the plaintiff, in good faith, was unable to col-
lect.150 However, the statute does not allow the court to reallocate, to any par-
ticular defendant, an amount of the uncollectible damages greater than that de-
fendant's comparative fault multiplied by the uncollectible amount.' 51 More-
over, defendants who the jury determines to be ten percent or less at fault are
not subject to any reallocation whatsoever.1 52 Additionally, defendants are not
subject to reallocation of uncollectible amounts of the damage award if their
fault is equal to or less than the fault of the plaintiff. 153 If a defendant falls
within the reallocation exceptions stated in the statute, then his share of the real-
location is deemed to be uncollectible and is once again reallocated amongst the
remaining parties. 54 Finally, any defendant who has had his share of the dam-
ages reallocated to the other parties is still subject to contribution actions
brought by his co-defendants and any continuing liability to the plaintiff.
55
C. Exceptions
The final major substantive provision of section 55-7-24 is that which
excepts certain types of parties from the statute's provisions. 56 These excep-
tions are based on the type of civil wrong for which a party is liable. 157 For in-
stance, the statute does not apply to parties who have been found liable for inju-
ries resulting from an intentional tort. 58 Likewise, the statute does not apply to
parties who have been found liable for injuries which resulted from their actions
while acting in concert with another person. 159 Similarly, parties who are found
liable for a toxic tort are excepted from the statute. 16° Finally, where a party is
150 See § 55-7-24 (c).
151 Id.
152 See § 55-7-24 (c)(4)(B).
153 See § 55-7-24 (c)(4)(A).
154 See § 55-7-24 (c)(6).
155 See § 55-7-24 (c)(5).
156 See § 55-7-24 (b)(1)-(4).
157 Id.
158 See § 55-7-24 (b)(1).
159 See § 55-7-24 (b)(2).
160 See § 55-7-24 (b)(3).
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strictly liable for manufacturing or selling a defective product, the provisions of
the statute do not apply to him.
161
V. ANALYSIS
It is quite clear that pure joint and several liability can often result in in-
justice and unfairness for solvent "deep pocket" defendants, especially those
with "deep pockets."' 62 Moreover, joint and several liability offends the prin-
ceples of comparative negligence because it does not comport with that doc-
trine's notions of fairness and because it ignores the principle of allocating li-
ability based on the jury's determination of fault, upon which comparative neg-
ligence is based. 163 Addressing these problems, some jurisdictions that once
used pure joint and several liability have moved to a system of pure several li-
ability. 164 Some jurisdictions, however, have avoided both of these doctrines
and have adopted hybrid systems of damages apportionment which contain fea-
tures of both doctrines.1 65 These hybrid systems are undoubtedly attempts at
compromise between plaintiffs and defendants which mitigate some of the un-
fairness to defendants that often results in a system of pure joint and several
liability. Section 55-7-24 of the West Virginia Code is a combination of two
typical hybrid systems.166 As such, section 55-7-24 is a step in the right direc-
tion for the State of West Virginia because it addresses many of the problems
associated with the State's prior regime of pure joint and several liability.
For instance, the statute provides that defendants who are thirty percent
or less at fault are only severally liable for the plaintiffs damages. 167 Thus,
notwithstanding the statute's subsequent reallocation provisions,' 68 a defendant
who is below this thirty percent threshold will not be required to pay more than
his fair share of damages. Although a defendant who is thirty percent or less at
fault may ultimately end up paying more than their fair share if damages are
161 See id.
162 See discussion supra Part III.A.
163 See discussion supra Part HI.B.
164 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (d) (1989); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1986);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17 reporters' note cmt. a (2000).
165 See RESTATEMENT § 17 cmt. a. The RESTATEMENT sets out five alternative systems of dam-
age apportionment. Id. Three of these alternatives represent typical hybrid systems which contain
vestiges of both joint and several liability and several liability. Id. The three typical hybrid sys-
tems include joint and several liability or several liability with a reallocation of uncollectible
shares of the damages, joint and several liability only for defendants whose fault exceeds a speci-
fied threshold and making defendants severally liable or jointly and severally liable for certain
kinds of damages (i.e. economic or noneconomic). See id. at §§ 17-E18.
166 West Virginia Code section 55-7-24 is a combination of a threshold system and a system of
joint and several liability with reallocation. See § 55-7-24; RESTATEMENT §§ C18, D18.
167 See § 55-7-24 (a)(2).
168 See § 55-7-24 (c)(1)-(6).
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uncollectible and reallocated, the fact remains that these defendants do not have
to bear the full burden of insolvency or immunity as they had often been re-
quired to do under the previous regime of pure joint and several liability.1
69
Moreover, under this statute, the most minimally responsible defendants
will never pay more than their fair share of damages because they are only sev-
erally liable and thus exempt from any reallocation of uncollectible shares.1
70
Additionally, if a defendant is less at fault than the plaintiff, he will also not pay
more than his fair share of the judgment.17' These threshold provisions mitigate
the problem of a minimally responsible defendant paying the entire judgment
when one or more of his co-defendants are insolvent, immune or otherwise un-
available. 72 Essentially, these provisions do not allow a one percent finding of
fault to morph into one-hundred percent liability. This will, in turn, reduce the
incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to use abusive litigation practices such as
"shotgun pleading". 73 Finally, minimally responsible "deep pocket" defendants
will be forced to act as social insurance or to bear the cost of activities which
society has immunized far less often under this statute than under pure joint and
several liability.
Although a defendant may be required to pay more than his fair share of
damages through the statute's reallocation provisions, 74 this procedure is still
fairer and more consistent with comparative negligence than pure joint and sev-
eral liability. Whereas the burden of insolvency, immunity and unavailability
was borne entirely by the remaining solvent defendants under joint and several
liability, this statute spreads that burden amongst all of the parties, including the
plaintiff, who were proximate causes of the injuries. 75 Moreover, because this
statute reallocates uncollectible damages based on the parties' relative percent-
ages of fault, 176 the statute is more in line with the apportionment principles of
comparative negligence than is pure joint and several liability. In other words,
the plaintiff will no longer have the convenience of collecting all of his damages
off of the defendant of his choice, usually the "deepest pocket", leaving that
defendant with the burden of collecting whatever amount of contribution that he
can from his less wealthy co-defendants. Now any damages that are reallocated
due to a co-defendant's insolvency or immunity are done so proportionately so
that the plaintiff must collect each defendant's share of reallocated damages,
based on the percentages of fault assigned by the jury.
169 Under this statute uncollectible damages are reallocated amongst all of the parties. See id.
170 § 55-7-24 (a)(2), (b)(4)(B).
171 See § 55-7-24 (b)(4)(A).
172 See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
173 See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
174 § 55-7-24 (c)(1)-(6).
175 See id.
176 Under this statute, the uncollectible portions of the plaintiff's damages are reallocated by
multiplying such uncollectible damages by the parties' original percentage of comparative fault.
See § 55-7-24 (c)(l)-(6).
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Although this statute is a step forward for West Virginia toward a more
equitable system of damage apportionment which is also more consistent with
the principles of comparative negligence, it does not go far enough. For in-
stance, a defendant who is just thirty one percent at fault is still subject to the
rules of joint and several liability under this statute. 177 Thus, these defendants
still may end up paying the entire judgment despite the fact that they are less
than fifty percent responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. This still disregards the
idea, inherent in comparative negligence, that damages should be apportioned
based on the percentage of fault which the jury assigns to each party. 178 More-
over, it leaves much of the unfairness of joint and several liability in that a de-
fendant who is thirty percent or more at fault could still end up paying out much
more money than he otherwise would have if he was only responsible for paying
his proportionate share of the damages. Moreover' because defendants who are
subject to the reallocation provisions must actually pay more than their fair
share of damages simply for the sake of compensating the plaintiff for his inju-
ries, this statute still requires defendants to stand in as social insurer's for the
plaintiff's injuries, although to a lesser extent than under joint and several liabil-
ity.
In addition, West Virginia Code section 55-7-24 inexplicably excepts
toxic tort and strict products liability actions from its provisions. 179 Unlike the
instances where a defendant has acted in concert with the other tortfeasors or
has committed an intentional tort, there is no logical reason for distinguishing
toxic torts and strict products liability. In the case of concerted action, it is logi-
cal to hold the tortfeasors jointly and severally liable. In fact, the earliest appli-
cations of joint and several liability were to cases where the defendants acted in
concert. 80 The rationale behind retaining joint and several liability for tortfea-
sors who act in concert is that a finding of concerted action establishes a legal
relationship between the actors so that "the act of one is the act of all.' 18' This
legal relationship precludes any apportionment of damages. 82 Moreover, it is
thought that tortfeasors who act in concert have a higher degree of culpability
that those who do not, thus making it fairer to hold them jointly and severally
liable. 83 Thus, most commentators agree that it is preferable to retain pure joint
177 See § 55-7-24 (a)(2).
178 See discussion supra Part HI.B. 1.
179 See § 55-7-24 (b)(3)-(4).
1s0 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 15 reporters' note
cmt. a (2000).
181 See, e.g., Woods v. Cole, 693 N.E.2d 333, 337 (I11. 998); RESTATEMENT § 15 reporters'
note cmt. a. (2000); Jerry J. Phillips, McIntyre v. Balentine and the Activist Tennessee Supreme
Court, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 33, 39 (1992).
182 See Woods, 693 N.E.2d at 337; RESTATEMENT § 15 reporters' note cmt. a.
183 See RESTATEMENT § 15 reporters' note cmt. a.
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and several liability for those tortfeasors who act in concert.' 84 Like tortfeasors
who act in concert, intentional tortfeasors have likewise been subject to joint
and several liability since the earliest cases. 185 Moreover, the intentional tortfea-
sor's state of mind supports the application of joint and several liability because,
like tortfeasors who act in concert, it connotes a higher degree of culpability.
186
Essentially, where a tortfeasor intentionally harms another person, he should not
be heard to complain when he is held responsible for the entirety of that per-
son's injuries.
Conversely, there is no similar logical justification for retaining pure
joint and several liability for toxic torts or strict products liability. In the case of
toxic torts, one may argue that there is a higher degree of culpability there as
well. 187 However, where one negligently emits a hazardous substance into the
environment there is no special state of mind or legal relationship which sug-
gests a higher degree of culpability. One may also argue, in the case of toxic
torts, that the apportionment of damages is not as easily apportioned as in other
actions.188  However, although not an exact science, comparative negligence
provides a method for apportioning fault. Because we use this method for other
"indivisible" injuries, there is no logical reason why it should not be used for
toxic tort actions.
Likewise, there is no logical reason to retain pure joint and several li-
ability for those defendants who are found liable for strict products liability.
Liability has been dramatically expanded in products liability cases over the last
184 See Wright, Logic and Fairness, supra note 26, at 47 n.7; Scheske, supra note 5, at 652;
Phillips, supra note 174, at 39; RESTATEMENT § 15 reporter's note cmt. a (2000). Many other
state legislatures have also retained pure joint and several liability for concerted action torts even
if they have abolished or limited it for other actions. See e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(6)
(1997); WIS. STAT. § 895.045 (2005); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(D)(1) (2006);
RESTATEMENT § 15 reporters' note cmt.a.
185 See e.g., Merryweather v. Nixon, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1337; see also RESTATEMENT § 12
reporters' note cmt. b.
186 See Scheske, supra note 5, at 652-653. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS supports im-
position of pure joint and several liability on intentional tortfeasors. See RESTATEMENT § 12.
Moreover, many commentators also support joint and several liability in this instance. See e.g.,
William E. Westerbeke, Survey of Kansas Law: Torts, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 33 (1984); Scheske,
supra note 5, at 652-653; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 12 reporters' note cmt. b. Many state
legislatures agree with this reasoning and have retained joint and several liability for intentional
tortfeasors despite abolishing or modifying it for other tortfeasors. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.81(4)(b) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9(2)(A) (2006); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5- 7(4)
(2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141(5)(b) (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(1) (2006);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601-02(5) (McKinney 2005); see also RESTATEMENT § 12 reporters' note cmt. b.
187 At least one commentator has espoused this view. See Scheske, supra note 5, at 653.
188 For example professor Wright gives the example of poison in a cup of coffee. Wright says
that if four Defendants each drop one drop of poison into a coffee cup, each sufficient to kill the
drinker, it would be silly to say that each Defendant is twenty five percent responsible for the
death of the drinker. See Wright, Logic and Fairness, supra note 26, at 56. One may be tempted
to use this example to justify imposition of joint and several liability for toxic torts.
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several decades. 189 Furthermore, judicial tests for a "defect" have become in-
creasingly open ended, allowing liability in suspect circumstances.190 Addition-
ally, liability for defective products is not based on negligence but rather strict
liability. 19' In other words, if a product happens to be defective it does not mat-
ter how it came to be that way and a product manufacturer may be found liable
despite the fact that he exercised the utmost care in manufacturing the prod-
uct. 192 For the foregoing reasons, the problem of one percent liability based on
scant justifications turning into one hundred percent liability is perhaps at its
greatest in strict products liability cases. Therefore there are very good reasons
why strict products liability is the one situation where the argument against joint
and several liability is at its strongest. Taking this into account, the exception of
strict products liability actions from the provisions of section 55-7-24 is not
warranted.
In summary, West Virginia Code section 55-7-24 is a step in the right
direction for West Virginia toward eliminating the injustices of joint and several
liability and making its damage apportionment scheme more consistent with the
principles of comparative negligence. The threshold provisions in the statute
assure that the most minimally responsible defendants are generally not going to
be held liable for all of the plaintiff's damages. This should relieve these defen-
dants, in most instances, from being subjected to abusive litigation practices,
asked to provide social insurance for the plaintiff's injuries, or asked to bear the
burden for activities which society has immunized. Moreover, even though a
defendant may be asked to pay more than his fair share of damages through
reallocation of uncollectible amounts, this is done in a way that is fairer and
more consistent with comparative negligence because the uncollectible amounts
are reallocated amongst all of the parties to the litigation based on their com-
parative fault. Because all of the parties, including the plaintiff, are included in
the reallocation, solvent defendants will no longer bear the entire risk of insol-
vent or immune co-defendants. That risk will now be distributed amongst the
parties according to their percentages of fault.
Although the statute is a step in the right direction, it does not go far
enough in remedying the unfairness of joint and several liability or its inconsis-
tency with comparative negligence. Defendants are still asked to pay more than
their fair share of damages when one or more of their co-defendants are insol-
vent, immune or otherwise unavailable even if the plaintiff has also been negli-
gent. Moreover, plaintiffs may still collect all of their damage award from any
189 See Twerski, supra note 1, at 1133.
190 See Aaron D. Twerski, From Defect To Cause To Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some
Products Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 299 (1977); 72A C.J.S. Products Liability §
11; RESTATEMENT § 2 cmt. a.
191 See Twerski, supra note 190, at 299; 72A C.J.S. Products Liability § 11; RESTATEMENT § 2
cmt. a.
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defendant who is more than thirty percent at fault. Finally, the statute does not
apply to certain actions even though there is no logical way to distinguish them
from other actions. This author believes that the West Virginia Legislature
should have further limited the application of joint and several liability. There-
fore, the next part of this Note will suggest a model statute which the legislature
ought to consider if they choose to reexamine this issue in the future.
VI. PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE
Joint and Several Liability Abolished; Exceptions
93
(a) In any cause of action involving the tortious conduct of
more than one party, the trial court shall:
(1) Instruct the jury to determine, or, if there is no jury, find, the
total amount of damages sustained by the claimant and the pro-
portionate fault of each of the parties in the litigation at the time
the verdict is rendered; and
(2) Enter judgment against each liable party on the basis of sev-
eral liability only, except that if any liable party is fifty-one per-
cent or more at fault, he shall be jointly and severally liable for
the claimant's injuries.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (2), subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, if a claimant is determined to be free of fault and through
good faith efforts is unable to collect from a liable party, the
claimant may, not later than six months after judgment becomes
final through lapse of time for appeal or through exhaustion of
appeal, whichever occurs later, move for reallocation of any un-
collectible amount among the other parties in the litigation.
(1) Upon the filing of such a motion, the court shall determine
whether all or part of a liable party's proportionate share of the
verdict is uncollectible from that defendant and shall reallocate
such uncollectible amount among the other parties in the litiga-
tion at the time the verdict is rendered, according to their per-
centages of fault: Provided, That the court shall not reallocate to
any party an uncollectible amount greater than that party's per-
centage of fault multiplied by such uncollectible amount.
193 This model statute is based, in large part, on West Virginia Code section 55-7-24. Thus, the
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(2) If such a motion is filed, the parties may conduct discovery
on the issue of collectability prior to a hearing on such motion.
(3) Any order regarding such motion shall be entered within one
hundred twenty days after the date of filing such a motion.
(4) A party's share of the obligation to a claimant may not be
increased by reason of reallocation under this subsection if the
jury determines that party's percentage of fault to be less than
ten percent.
(6) If any party's share of the obligation to any claimant is not
increased by reason of the application of subdivision (4) of this
subsection, the amount of that defendant's share of the realloca-
tion shall be considered uncollectible and shall be reallocated
among all other parties who are not subject to subdivision (4) of
this subsection, including the claimant, in the same manner as
otherwise provided in this subsection.
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (2), of subsection (a) of this
section, the rules of joint and several liability shall apply to:
(1) Any party who acted with the intention of inflicting injury
or damage; or
(2) Any party who acted in concert with another person as part
of a common plan or design resulting in harm.
(d) If a judgment is entered against a party based on subdivi-
sion (2), of subsection (a) or subdivision(l) or (2) of subsection
(c) of this section, nothing in this section shall be construed to
effect his right of contribution against any of the other parties
for their proportionate share of the claimant's damages or im-
pair or to abrogate any other right of indemnity or contribution
arising out of any contract or agreement or any right of indem-
nity otherwise provided by law.
(e) Nothing in this section creates or recognizes, either explic-
itly or impliedly, any new or different cause of action not oth-
erwise recognized by law.
(f) Nothing in this section may be construed to affect, impair or
abrogate the provisions of section seven, article twelve-a, chap-
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ter twenty-nine of this code or section nine, article seven-b of
this chapter.1
94
Although this model statute parallels WestVirginia Code section 55-7-
24 a great deal, there are several substantive differences. For instance, the model
statute is divided up into situations where either the plaintiff is or is not at fault.
Where the plaintiff is at fault, judgment is to be entered against each defendant
on the basis of several liability only. Judgment is entered in this way because
several liability cures the ill effects of pure joint and several liability in relation
to defendants. 9 5 Under this model statute, the plaintiff would be responsible for
the collection of each defendant's proportionate share of the damages, and no
defendant, except those who are more than fifty percent at fault, will be required
to pay more than their fair share of the judgment. Furthermore, several liability
is completely consistent with the liability apportionment principles of compara-
tive negligence in that each party is required to pay an amount that corresponds
to his percentage of fault, as determined by the jury. 196 The model statute is also
consistent with fair play and corrective justice in that each defendant who is less
than half at fault pays only his fair share of the plaintiffs damages, such that
justice is done between each of those defendants and the plaintiff.
Even where the plaintiff has been determined to be partially at fault, the
model statute retains pure joint and several liability for those defendants who
are at least fifty-one percent at fault. This is, in effect, a threshold provision.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts suggests that thresholds, especially those over
fifty percent, are not an effective way to ameliorate the problems inherent in
joint and several liability. 97 This author would beg to differ, especially if the
effectiveness of thresholds is viewed in the context of this jurisdiction's com-
parative negligence regime.
The threshold in the model statute (fifty-one percent) is considerably
higher than that found in section 55-7-24 (thirty percent) for two reasons. First,
the purpose of a threshold is to eliminate the problem of minimally responsible
defendants being on the hook for an entire judgment. In other words, the only
instance in which any defendant should be responsible for all of a plaintiff's
damages under a proper threshold regime is when that defendant crosses a cer-
tain threshold of fault, at which point it cannot be fairly argued that he is mini-
mally at fault. Section 55-7-24's thirty percent threshold is too low to effec-
tively accomplish the purpose of a threshold provision. Under a thirty percent
194 This section of the West Virginia Code involves political subdivisions for whom joint and
several liability has already been modified. See W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-7 (2005).
195 See RESTATEMENT § B18 cmt. a.
196 Comparative negligence represents the idea that liability can and should be apportioned
proportionate to a parties negligence. See Pearson, supra note 64, at 344. Similarly, pure several
liability requires a defendant to pay no more of the plaintiffs damages than his comparative re-
sponsibility share. See RESTATEMENT § 11 cmt. a.
197 See RESTATEMENT § 17 cmt. a (2000).
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threshold, a defendant who shoulders less that one third of the fault could still be
on the hook for the entire judgment. A fifty-one percent threshold, such as the
one in the model statute, is the most logical point at which the threshold should
be set because, at that point, it could no longer be argued that the defendant is
minimally at fault because he, in fact, shoulders a majority of the blame.
Second, the threshold provision in the model statute is more consistent
with the proportionate loss allocation principles espoused by this jurisdiction's
comparative negligence regime. For instance, West Virginia's comparative neg-
ligence regime apportions losses proportionately until a plaintiffs fault equals
or exceeds the combined fault of the other parties, at which time it requires the
plaintiff to bear the full costs of his losses.' 98 Section 55-7-24, on the other
hand, would require a defendant to bear the full burden for the plaintiff's losses
when he is only thirty percent at fault. Like West Virginia's comparative negli-
gence regime, this model statute's threshold provision allocates losses propor-
tionately until a particular defendant's fault exceeds the combined fault of the
other parties, at which time that defendant could be responsible for the entirety
of the plaintiff's losses.
Finally, the threshold provision in this model statute is consistent with
the notions of fairness embodied in this jurisdiction's comparative negligence
regime. While defendants who are more than fifty-one percent at fault may still
be forced to pay the entire judgment, this is not necessarily inconsistent with
principles of fairness in West Virginia's comparative negligence regime. For
instance, once a defendant is found to be fifty-one percent or more at fault, he is
necessarily more at fault than all of the other parties involved in the litigation,
combined. In this author's opinion, it would not be completely unfair to ask
such a defendant to bear the entire burden of the plaintiffs losses. Moreover,
the comparative negligence regime adopted in this jurisdiction takes a very simi-
lar approach, as it requires a plaintiff to bear the entire burden of his losses if his
fault is determined to equal or exceed the combined fault of all of the other par-
ties in the litigation. 199 Thus, the threshold provision in this model statute is
completely consistent with the level of fairness that this jurisdictions attempts to
achieve in its comparative negligence regime.
Where the plaintiff is free of fault, the model statute still provides for
several liability for the above stated reasons. But in these instances, the model
statute would allow any uncollectible portions to be reallocated among all of the
defendants in relation to their comparative fault. Where a plaintiff is, in fact,
free of fault he stands on a higher moral footing than the at-fault defendants
because, while they have been determined to be a necessary cause of the injury
producing accident, he has not.200 Thus, it is fairer in these situations to ask a
defendant, who is a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries, to pay more than his
198 See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 1979).
199 See id.
200 See discussion supra Part II.A.5.
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original fair share than it would be to let the innocent plaintiff go grossly under-
compensated. The reallocation of uncollectible shares should work to provide
innocent plaintiffs with substantial compensation in most instances. Moreover,
the reallocation is somewhat consistent with the proportionate loss allocation
embodied in comparative negligence, as the uncollectible shares would be real-
located based on the defendants' percentage of comparative negligence.
The model statute, like West Virginia Code section 55-7-24, does not
apply the reallocation provisions to defendants whose percentage of fault is less
than ten percent. This will ensure that the most minimally responsible defen-
dants pay no more than their fair share of the plaintiffs damages, as determined
by the jury. In turn, plaintiffs will have less incentive to engage in abusive tac-
tics such as "shotgun pleading" to ensure they receive substantial compensation.
It is not lost on this author that this may lead to situations where the plaintiff
may not be able to find a solvent defendant and may go undercompensated. But
it is not possible for the law to guarantee the plaintiff a solvent defendant in all
circumstances. 20 1 For example, if there is only one defendant and that defendant
happens to be insolvent, the law does not shift the loss to another person but,
instead, leaves it where it falls.20 2 Because the law does not and could not guar-
antee the plaintiff a solvent defendant in every instance, this model statute does
not attempt to do so either.
Finally, the statute retains pure joint and several liability only for inten-
tional tortfeasors and those tortfeasors who act in concert. This is because of the
state of mind, legal relationship, and higher degree of culpability that these
situations entail.20 3 It should be noted that full joint and several liability is not
retained for toxic torts or strict products liability. There is no logical way to
distinguish these actions from those to which the model statute applies.2°
Moreover, strict products liability may actually be the one cause of action where
joint and several liability is most problematic.2 5 Because of the foregoing rea-
sons, these actions receive no special treatment under the model statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, pure joint and several liability often results in injustices
and unfairness to solvent defendants, especially those who are perceived as hav-
ing "deep pockets". These defendants are often required to pay more than their
fair share of a plaintiffs damages where one or more co-defendants are insol-
vent, immune, or otherwise unavailable. As a result, "deep pocket" defendants
201 See Manzer, supra note 40, at 645; Pearson, supra note 65, at 363.
202 Id.
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are often exposed to further injustices such as being required to act as social
insurers, being subjected to abusive litigation practices such as "shotgun" plead-
ing, and requiring some defendants to bear the entire burden for risk createng
activity which society has chosen to immunize. Additionally, joint and several
liability is wholly inconsistent with the principles of comparative negligence
because it ignores that doctrine's preference for fairness and proportional loss
allocation.
West Virginia Code section 55-7-24 is a step in the right direction in
addressing the problems attendant to joint and several liability and attempting to
mitigate the injustices and inconsistencies associated with that doctrine. Al-
though West Virginia Code section 55-7-24 represents a step forward in ad-
dressing the problems created by joint and several liability, the West Virginia
Legislature did not go far enough in doing so, leaving much of the injustice and
inconsistencies in place. This author feels that the model statute put forward in
this Note should is a more equitable way to apportion damages in West Vir-
ginia. The author also feels that the model statute is more in line with the prin-
ciples of comparative negligence than West Virginia Code 55-7-24. Therefore,
the author believes that the model statute should be considered by the West Vir-
ginia Legislature the next time it takes up this issue.
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